ne fiat tantum
iustitia, sed et pateat fieri
“Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly
and undoubtedly be seen to be done”
– Lord Chief Justice Hewart
Justice is a basic virtue. It may
not be a “cloistered virtue” but in delivering justice, the Pakistani judicial
system ought to ensure that its end-product is not only ‘just’ but its process
of dispensation is perceived as ‘just’ too. Before we discuss some of the glitches in this process, let us ask what
constitutes a ‘good judge’? It is said that a good judge conceives
quickly and judges slowly. That is, “judicis est jus dicere, non dare” (trans.:
it is the property of a judge to administer justice, not to give it) and “judex habere
debet duos sales, salem sapientiae,
ne sit insipidus, et salem eonscientiae,
ne sit diabolus” (trans.: a judge ought to have two kinds of salts-the salt of wisdom, that he may not be insipid and the salt of
conscience, that he may not be a devil). An empirical study of Canadian
judges by McCormick and Greene has identified seven essential traits of a ‘good
judge’: industry and diligence, courtesy, empathy, patience, knowledge of the
law, intelligence, and sense of fair play. Independence of judiciary is often
considered as a key enabler for a ‘good judge’ and the bedrock of a civilized,
democratic society. Operationalisation and institutionalisation of judicial
independence in Pakistan entails four core components, namely (a.) security of
service of judges, (b.) financial adequacy in terms of salaries and benefits of
judges, (c.) administrative freedom to develop the rules and procedures to
manage the litigation process for dispensation of justice fairly, transparently
and consistently, and (d.) judicial accountability to ensure ethics, integrity
and discipline within the judicial system.
But what does ‘independence of
judiciary’ mean for Pakistanis in the first instance? There are two core
ingredients of judicial independence. And while people in Pakistan often
mention the first one, that is, the separation of judiciary from the other two
branches of government, executive and the legislative, there is little emphasis
on the second ingredient, namely a guarantee that judges make decisions free of
any influence or conflict of interest, without fear or favour, affection or ill
will, and solely on the basis of fact and law.
The first ingredient not just
ensures a trichotomy and separation of powers but it also puts an extra onus on
each branch of the state of Pakistan to avoid assuming responsibilities or
intruding into other branches of the state, just as Lord Dilhorne advised the
judges “to stay out of the arena” and “neither have nor assume
responsibilities” to be a prosecutor or a plaintiff. Pakistan’s judiciary has
come a long way from Chief Justice Munir’s deathblow to constitutionalism and
rule of law in 1955 that paved the way for future extra-constitutional actions,
and judiciary’s ensuing validations of military governments to the present judicial
hyperactivism of 2012. In the past few years, an overzealous and aggressive
judiciary in Pakistan has, prima-facie, often gotten embroiled into
executive and legislative business in a climactic order. For instance, the
public and legal opinions remain divided over some of the Court’s intrusive
judgements such as the conviction and in effect dismissal of a prime minister
and thereby a federal cabinet on charges of contempt, the direction to dismiss
Balochistan government on failure to maintain law and order in the province,
the annulment of a constitutional amendment that had defined a procedure for
judicial appointments and instead seizing the de facto hiring and firing
powers for itself, the annulment of laws such as the law of contempt which had
permitted fair speech relating a judgement or a judge’s conduct, treated all
judicial officers equally and provided immunity to holders of public office
while performing their functions, the monitoring of and directions on prices of
everyday consumer goods like sugar, fuel, gas etc, and the handling of
allegations of bribery and blackmailing on the chief justice’s son. It is
obvious that the delimitation of powers and obligations of various branches and
organs of the state in Pakistan is still evolving and an institutional
equilibrium has not arrived yet. A historical sense of insecurity and mistrust
has kept the organs of state busy fighting turf wars, while little attention
has been paid on improving the internal dynamics, processes and efficiencies
within their respective domains. Ironically, when institutional heads
relentlessly critique or advise another institution on how it should perform
but have little interest, time or energy to do realistic and pragmatic
institution-building at home then a ‘balanced government’ and ‘institutional
equilibrium’ may remain unfulfilled dreams.
While the first ingredient of
judicial independence sets a framework for constitutional governance and lawful
coordination and interaction between branches of the state, it is the second
ingredient that would promise true rule of law in Pakistan. Judicial
impartiality, integrity and accountability are the supreme judicial virtues, as
these generate public confidence and institutional legitimacy. Lord Bowen
emphasized, “judges, like Caesar’s wife, should be above suspicion.” Note that
administration of justice is not synonymous to public administration or to a
political movement. The courts are apolitical institutions that draw their
powers from constitution and laws, and should not seek power from
interest groups whether it is media or the bar. In fact, too cosy relationships
between the bench and the bar, or between the bench and the counsels for either
party, or with the parties themselves are detrimental to judicial impartiality and
accountability in Pakistan. For instance, although the precise number of visits
and speeches made by the chief justice of Pakistan to various bar associations
across the country or the delegations received in the office vice versa
since 2005, and likewise by other members of the superior judiciary, is not
available but, based on media reports, these have happened on a regular basis,
almost on every other weekend. It is not a surprise that few commentators have
questioned those appointments to the superior judiciary, when lawyers were
apparently rewarded for their personal or financial contributions to the
movement for reinstatement of the chief justice. A question arises whether
there exist effective checks and balances to safeguard against judicial
cronyism and malpractice and to ensure judicial integrity and impartiality in
the administration of justice in Pakistan?
![]() |
|
Corvinus, Johannes Arnoldi
Iurisprudentia Romana
Amsterdam, 1644
|
Justice has to be impartial
(think, why is it shown blindfolded in statues) and the central tenets of administration
of justice are impartiality and public scrutiny of judicial process. It can not
be assured in Pakistan without adherence to the principles of open justice,
judicial accountability and its performance benchmarking. This means that the
proceedings are conducted in an open court accessible to the public and the
media, judges speak through their reasoned judgements only and publish
reasons for their decisions, accord complete procedural fairness to parties,
avoid perceived or real bias whether it is bias on account of obstinacy or
arising out of preconceived notions or an institutional bias, and ensure
absolute fairness of the suit/trial. Nothing is more unfair than venal justice
and “judex bonus nihil ex arbitrio suo faciat, nee propositio domesticiae
voluntatis, sed juxta leges et jura pronunciet” (trans.:
a good judge ought to do nothing of his own pleasure, nor may he have in view the gratification
of
his
private
inclination,
but
pronounce
according
to
law
and justice). This is why Jeremy Bentham argued that, “publicity is the keenest spur to exertion
and the surest of all guards against improbity; it keeps the judge, while
trying, under trial,” and Chief Justice Gleeson explained that open
justice and judicial accountability to the public are guaranteed through close
scrutiny by both the legal and general communities. On the contrary, the working of the Court has become
increasingly opaque in Pakistan with only a very small group of judges
entrusted with sensitive cases relating to other organs of the state, with
likely suppression of dissent on the bench such as those headed by the chief
justice invariably deliver unanimous verdicts, and with a lack of transparency
such as the refusal to parliamentary public accounts committee audits or even
failure to disclose accounts to public, if there were any internal or external
audits. H.G. Wells said, “In the Country of the Blind the One-Eyed Man is
King.” Public scrutiny of country’s judicial processes is imperative to
strengthen the judicial independence and judiciary in Pakistan, as in the words
of Justice William Brennan, “it enhances the quality of proceedings and
safeguards the fact-finding process which benefits both the defendant and the
society.” This implies that transparency and public scrutiny safeguard against
any attempt to corrupt a judicial system, promise justice as well as a just and
balanced government, and promote judicial integrity and capacity. One is
reminded here of Lord Acton’s warning, “everything secret degenerates, even the
administration of justice; nothing is safe that does not show it can bear
discussion and publicity.” This should also facilitate an institutional
equilibrium in Pakistan, which is not a free market phenomenon but a legal
balance that respects institutions’ roles based on constitution and laws and
not on individual ego or self-service.
Judges speak through their
decisions and judicial officers are not supposed to play to the galleries.
Chief Justice Warren Burger commented, “judges
rule on the basis of law, not public opinion, and they should be
indifferent to pressures of the times.” The Pakistani judicial system faces
four key systemic challenges in this context, (a.) a bolshie use of the power
of ‘judicial review,’ which raises two concerns: Firstly, ‘judicial review’ is
actually meant to review not just violations of constitutional and legal rights
of citizens but also a misuse or abuse of powers by all functionaries of
the state, including the judicial officers at all levels. The maxim -
“be you ever so high, the law is above you” - applies to the judicial officers
as well. It is thus imperative to incorporate detailed guidelines for Judicial
Ethics either within a standard Code of Judicial Conduct or into the
recruitment offers and oaths of all judicial officers in Pakistan. Secondly,
the wilful exercise of ‘judicial review’ has lacked consistency in application
and interpretation. Rhetorical political posturing or micromanaging the
business of the state by a court undermines its legitimacy in the long run. The
precise number of suo moto proceedings by the superior judiciary in
Pakistan since 2005 is not available but these are likely to be in hundreds.
Would this actually deliver ‘justice’ or would the Court be perceived as a
judge, jury and executioner?; (b.) an undue use or threat of the Contempt of Court
law which has in reality suppressed even meaningful critique of judgements or a
judge’s private conduct in the country; (c.) issue of “angel petitions,”
wherein either a lawyer/court staff lodge a proxy plaint on behalf of the presiding
officer or the brother/sister judges and magistrates use their power of
‘cognisance’ to lodge/initiate a suit in another court; and (d.) conduct of
preliminary investigations, prima-facie determination of culpability of
an offence worthy of prosecution, and so an assumption of ‘trial’ functions by
the superior courts that seriously taints the judicial process. In fact, such a
misuse or abuse of judicial powers could effectively make the courts/judges
parties to an issue, drastically affect procedural fairness by limiting avenues
to recourse, impression and prejudice the investigation agencies, prosecution
and trial courts, and may lie on the borderline of judicial autocracy.
The approach of a society to the
role of its judges has critical implications for judicial ethics, integrity and
accountability. Firstly, there is a historic divide between judges as ‘umpires’
and ‘interpreters of law and constitution’ and ‘political judges’ who become
‘arm of popular opinion.’ Some might argue that the first role is for judges in
a stable society and the second role for judges in an unstable society ridden
with injustices and inequalities which by its nature may require a ‘political
court.’ But note that the effects of environmental factors and social stimuli
on personality make-up have been empirically validated and judges are also
products of a society. So what evidence does one have that the arbiters in an
unstable, chaotic society themselves or the politics of judges will not be a
product of similar stressors, or owe their offices to similar inequalities, or
are not impressioned by popular opinion, and are rather emotionally and
psychologically stable? Shouldn’t judicial appointments in Pakistan require
prior psychological testing to assess candidates’ emotional and social
quotients and evaluate their personal and social competence, such as in
Austria, Hungary, the Netherlands or Kyrgyzstan and the civil-military
bureaucracy in Pakistan? Secondly, by the same token, one can argue that
judicial system in an unstable, chaotic society as Pakistan’s, ridden with
several disparities, is as a matter of fact also heavily burdened with a
plethora of cases which delays or limits timely access, delivery and
affordability of justice. In such a situation, there is an inherent risk in
consolidating all supreme powers in one Court or office, as it would exacerbate
unwarranted turf wars, lead to a gridlock and cause delays. In order to
expedite and streamline dispensation of justice to the common man especially in
regard to routine civil, criminal or other special laws, and to avoid bringing
the government to a standstill, as one notices that the incumbent government
has probably less governed but spent much of its 5-years term in the Court, and
in order to strengthen the system of checks and balances, it is now necessary
to establish a ‘Constitutional Court’ in Pakistan, such as in Germany, Austria,
France, Turkey or Egypt, that is entrusted with the exclusive responsibility of
interpretation of the constitution. Thirdly, the current procedure for judicial
appointments in Pakistan wherein the Court enjoys primacy and has the de
facto hiring and firing powers for itself is contrary to the fundamental
principle of natural justice, “nemo judex in causa sua” (trans.: no man may be a judge in his own
cause). The joint parliamentary committee need to be strengthened
and should have more powers in the recommendation and confirmation to
appointment and the recommendation to removal of judges from office. In fact,
all appointments to the superior judiciary should be subject to its
confirmation hearings.
Judicial independence is often considered as the reason
why judges and the bar would seldom talk about judicial ethics, integrity,
accountability, impartiality and transparency. However, the fundamental reason
for judicial independence should not be ignored. As Justice McGarvie reasoned,
“it is important not to cast a good principle too widely. The only independence
which I seek to justify within the principle of judicial independence, is that
which, if absent, would put at risk impartiality in deciding court cases.”
Judicial independence has to be in the interest of justice and it is,
therefore, imperative that it vests in persons who will behave in an ethical
manner in their judicial and personal lives. Lord Buckmaster advised, “the
importance of preserving the administration of justice from anything which can
even by remote imagination infer a bias or interest in the Judge is so grave
that any inconvenience experienced in its preservation may be cheerfully
endured.” The chief justice of Pakistan would do well if he is able to develop
enduring ethical values, structures, processes and efficiencies throughout the
judicial system which create a sustainable institutional legitimacy that is a
rational, pro tanto moral obligation based on the rule of law, and is
not person-centred or based around a cult or clique within the Court/judicial
system. One of the responsibilities of being a judge is that one is expected to
rise above one’s mortal self and dispense justice with a divine-like
objectivity. One must not forget the maxim – “qui altari serviunt ab altari vivant” (trans.:
they who serve at the altar, should live by the altar). Those who feel shy of taking this
responsibility and meeting the demands of this role had better not vie for it.
So, who will judge the judges?
The people of Pakistan have every right to ask what mechanisms have been put in
place to check on the use, misuse and abuse of judicial power, what code of
judicial conduct and judicial ethics oversee court personnel and ensure
judicial integrity and impartiality, what legal and ethical guidelines direct a
judge’s disqualification or recusal, what rules govern a judge’s civic,
charitable, quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities, what rules monitor a
judge’s personal finances, business or financial dealings, and financial
disclosures, what rules administer a judge’s political activities or expression
of views on contentious political issues, and so on. In essence, how effective
and efficient these mechanisms are really working, if they do exist, or
else what effort is being made to genuinely strengthen the institution instead
of bolstering an office, person or turf war? Justice Louis Brandeis famously
wrote, “sunshine is the best of disinfectants,” and his prescription is valid
when it comes to the administration of justice in Pakistan!

No comments:
Post a Comment