al-mulk yabqā ʹalā al-kufr wa lā
yabqā ʹalā al-zulm
(a government may survive with
unbelief but not with injustice)
On Thursday, Sept 27, Sardar
Akhtar Mengal, estranged Baloch leader and president of the Balochistan National
Party appeared before the Supreme Court in its suo moto hearing on the
current situation in Balochistan and spelled out grievances of the Baloch
people eloquently. Sardar Mengal outlined his six-point charter to the Court,
which he likened to Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehan’s Six Points, to extricate the
province and thereby the country out of the current morass. Before we analyze
the relationship between the two Six Points and the road ahead, it would be
helpful to briefly trace back and refresh the major Baloch conflicts and
rebellions (see table 1).|
2003-Present
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Insurgency following Pakistan’s
signing of Gwadar Port project in Beijing with China, start of its
construction, and plan to build three new cantonments in the province.
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1973-77
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Insurgency following Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto’s executive dismissal of the nationalist provincial government of
Balochistan.
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1963-69
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Sher Muhammad Marri led an
insurgency of Marri, Bugti and Mengal tribes against the establishment of new
military cantonments, which ended in a truce with the abolition of ‘one unit’
and the grant of provincial status to Balochistan.
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1958-60
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Mir Naurouz Khan, sardar of
Zehri tribe, escaped to the mountains after the arrest of Khan of Kalat, led
an insurgency which ended in a truce, his surrender and eventual hanging.
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1958
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Pakistan purchased Gwadar from
the Emirate of Oman.
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1948
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Prince Abdul Kareem, younger
brother of the Khan of Kalat, revolted against the decision of the Shahi
Jirga of 1947 and the Khan of Kalat’s signing of the Instrument of Accession
to Pakistan in March 1948, and escaped to Afghanistan, though he returned
after few months.
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1928-30
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Persian invasion and occupation of the
Western Balochistan (current Iranian Sistan). Ameer Dost Muhammad Baloch
hanged in Tehran.
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1918-19
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The British crush Marri Insurgency.
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1916
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The British crush insurgency by Gumshadzai,
Muhammadzai and Ismaeelzai tribes.
|
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1907
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Insurgency led by Bahram Khan Baranzahi and
defeat of Persian/Qajar forces. Bahram Khan recognized as the King of
Balochistan.
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1896
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Insurgency led by Sardar Hussein Narui
Baloch, crushed by Anglo-Persian troops.
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1880s
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Insurgency in the Zhob valley, crushed by the
British.
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1871
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Persian and British governments
drew the “Goldsmith Line” which currently forms the international border
between Iran and Pakistan.
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1859-67
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Khan of Kalat and the British
fight several battles against the Marris and Bugtis.
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1849
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Persian/Qajar invasion and
occupation of the Western Balochistan and the Baloch defeat.
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1845-48
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The Kachchi Insurgency of Marri
and Bugti tribes against the British.
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1843
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Baloch lose the Battle of
Meanee against the British East India Company. Balochistan dismembered.
British Balochistan created.
|
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1840
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Baloch (Marri tribe) win the
Battle of Kehan against the British.
|
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1839
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Mir Mehrab, Khan of Kalat
signed a Treaty with the British to provide passage and supplies to the
British troops in the first Anglo-Afghan War. However, Mir Mehrab was later
deposed and killed by the British. Kalat allowed the British government to
station troops and rule with a British Resident under the Treaty of 1841. The
British made Kalat a princely state by a subsequent Treaty in 1854.
|
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late 18th C.
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Baloch raids on southern Sindh
and temporary occupation of southern Sindh.
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1765
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Mir Naseer, Khan of Kalat
joined forces of the Afghan King Ahmad Shah Durrani in their victorious
battle against Sikhs near Lahore.
|
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1758
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War between the Afghan King
Ahmad Shah Durrani and Mir Naseer, Khan of Kalat, which ended in a truce and
the ‘Treaty of Kalat’ between Qandhar and Kalat.
|
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1704
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Insurgency in Qandhar,
suppressed by Ghilzai Pashtuns of Afghanistan.
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1698-99
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Insurgency against the Safavid
Empire, suppressed by Gurgin Khan.
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Table 1: A historical snapshot
of major conflicts and insurgencies in Balochistan
|
|
Winston Churchill once said: “the
longer you can look back, the farther you can look forward.” Looking through
this historical lens (table 1) at the outset is necessary because it provides a
quick glimpse of the Baloch culture and tradition, their interactions with
external actors (i.e. a conflict between intruders and natives, and within
natives), and how they were successfully managed by the external actors, if so
at times, in the recent history. Internally, three key traditions have shaped
the Baloch way of life: (a.) recognition of Baloch honour and freedom, not
subjugation and dependence, (b.) loyalty to no one but to himself and his
people, (c.) a Zoroastrian outlook to relationships which may be
‘transactional,’ a belief in perpetual and protracted battles against forces deemed
‘evil’ by the Baloch people, and enmities once started would never easily
subside. Externally, Colonel Sandeman’s governance model provides the best
insight into how peace and goodwill was cultivated with the Baloch people, inter-alia,
by: (a.) recognition of personal and tribal honour and freedom, (b.) feudal
titles, privy purses, Levy system and privileges of tribal chiefs to collect
revenue from tribesmen and servants, and (c.) policy of indirect rule and
tribal alliances (i.e. a mix of political finesse and military force with no
nurturing of democratic institutions or traditions). Cognisant of this, both
Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan had speculated on the nature of political reforms
required in Balochistan at their Sibbi Darbars of 1948 and 1949 respectively.
In fact, in 1948, Jinnah established an interim “Governor-General’s Advisory
Council” in Balochistan and entrusted it with the responsibility and power to
examine future economic, social,
political, educational and other administrative schemes before these were
submitted to the Governor-General. Later, Liaquat Ali Khan constituted a
“Reform Committee on Balochistan” in 1950 to recommend constitutional and
administrative changes in Balochistan to bring it at par with other federating
units. However, the subsequent story of reforms in Balochistan is a sad tale of
missed opportunities and mismanaged or misdirected initiatives.
Balochistan is rich with natural
resources including petroleum, natural gas, and significant deposits of coal,
chromites, quartzites, sulphur, limestone, marble, iron ore, uranium, copper
and gold. It has 95% of the asbestos in the world and the copper/gold deposits
at Reko-Diq and Saindek mines are estimated to be among the largest in the
world. Moreover, the deep water port built with Chinese assistance in Gwadar
offers it a unique geostrategic advantage, as it lies at the mouth of the
Strait of Hormuz, overlooks the Mumbai port and India’s west coast, competes
with neighbouring Iran’s Chabahar port and is not far from Dubai either. The
port offers the shortest route for Central Asian oil exports and for trade with
Western China (the distance from Dubai to Shanghai (via Indian Ocean and Strait
of Malacca) is 9,000 miles while from Dubai via Khunjerab (Pakistan) it is only
3,300 miles). The strategic competition around Gwadar deep sea port and its
related access routes and energy and trade corridors linking Middle East,
Central Asia and China is obvious and significant, as is the Iranian and Indian
wariness, and the local Balochi mistrust towards the port largely due to a
perceived non-inclusive approach of the Pakistani government in its development
and implementation.
Fast Forward 2012 - and Pakistan
finds itself in a similar predicament, as it was in the late 1960s following Sheikh
Mujib-ur-Rehman’s demand for provincial autonomy and equitable sharing of
resources under his Six Points manifesto (see table 2). First introduced on
February 5, 1966 at a conference of all opposition parties convened by
Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Mujib’s Six Points later became the manifesto of
Awami League in 1970 and the rallying cry for the Bengali self-determination.
Notwithstanding the controversy that the Six Points were not Mujib’s
brainchild, as Nur-ul-Amin asserted that these were inspired by some foreign
power or were advised by some civil servants from East Pakistan whereas a
witness Rafiq-ul-Hassan alleged before the Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission that
Altaf Gauhar was the author of the draft Six Points at the behest of President
Ayub Khan who wanted to scuttle the all parties Conference, the reality was/is
that Mujib’s Six Points programme was a proposed constitutional solution of
East Pakistan’s problems which needed a redressal on priority but with
political acumen and without any self-interest. It was but political greed and
incompetence that the political deadlock between the winning political parties
in the East and the West, and the interim government, over the transfer of
power following the 1970 elections could not be resolved amicably and the
postponement of the National Assembly session triggered a chain of events that
ended with the dismemberment of the country.
|
Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman’s Six
Points
February 5, 1966
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Sardar Akhtar Mengal’s Six
Points
September 27, 2012
|
|
The Constitution should provide
for a federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of the Lahore
Resolution, and a parliamentary form of government with supremacy of
legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise.
|
All covert and overt military
operations against the Baloch people should be ended immediately.
|
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The federal government shall
deal with only two subjects Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other
residuary subjects shall vest in the federating states.
|
All missing persons should be
procured before a court of law.
|
|
Two separate but
freely convertible currencies for two wings should be introduced, or if this
is not feasible, there should be one currency for the whole country, but
effective constitutional provisions should be introduced to stop the flight of capital from East
to West Pakistan. Furthermore, a separate Banking Reserve should be established and
separate fiscal and monetary policies be adopted for East Pakistan.
|
All proxy death squads
operating under the supervision of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and
Military Intelligence (MI) should be disbanded.
|
|
The power of taxation and
revenue collection shall vest in the federating unit and that the federal
centre will have no such power. The federation will be entitled to a share in
the state taxes to meet its expenditures. The consolidated federal fund shall
come out of a levy of certain percent of all state taxes.
|
Baloch political parties should
be allowed to function and resume their political activities without any
interference from intelligence agencies.
|
|
There shall be two separate
accounts for foreign exchange earnings in two wings. Earnings of East
Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan government and that of
West Pakistan under the control of West Pakistan government. Foreign exchange
requirement of the federal government shall be made by the two wings either
equally or in a ratio to be fixed. Indigenous products shall move free of
duty between the two wings. The constitution shall empower the unit governments
to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in
and enter into agreement with foreign countries.
|
Persons responsible for inhuman
torture, killing and dumping of dead bodies of the Baloch political leaders
and activists should be brought to justice.
|
|
Federating units must be
empowered to raise their own militia or paramilitary force freely for
enhancing the regional and national defence effectively.
|
Measures should be taken for
the rehabilitation of thousands of displaced Baloch living in appalling
condition
|
|
Table 2: The Six-Point
Charters – From Dacca to Quetta
|
|
It is said that history repeats
itself because we refuse to learn the lessons from the past. Pakistan comes a
full circle with Sardar Akhtar Mengal’s presentation of his six-point charter
to the Supreme Court and the true political leadership need to stand up now and
take critical decisions. There is nothing horrendous in Mengal’s
recommendations and ignoring them is like escaping from reality, an
inconvenient and bitter truth and so an act of self-denial. Regardless whether
Mengal’s assertions are his brainchild or not, or whether these are true and
substantiable or a false propaganda, the fact is that these reflect a deep and
simmering sense of alienation, exploitation and oppression – akin to what the
Bengalis complained. The difference being that, prima-facie, Mujib’s Six
Points objected to political and economic exploitation and sought more
political autonomy and equitable distribution of resources, whereas Mengal’s Six
Points criticize physical oppression and tyranny and seek protection of
fundamental rights of the citizens. It is tragic that the state seems to have
made little administrative or intellectual progress in the past five decades
and has rather morphed from a state where 22 families controlled over 66% of
industrial capital, 79% of insurance and 80% of banking in 1968 (cf: Dr.
Mahbub-ul-Haq, The London Times, March 22, 1973) to a state where a new class
of robber-barons, cronyism, injustice and tyranny has become a hallmark now. As
Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haq said, “the problem is not the 22 families, individually or
collectively, but the system that created them, and it is time that Pakistan
looked to the basic causes of its problems and not merely symptoms.”
A true patriot must scrutinize
the actions of his government with utmost vigilance and must speak out whenever
there is a breach of rightness; it is therefore a function of the citizen to
keep the government from falling into the error. So when we examine Baloch relationship
with the federation dispassionately, we find that over-centralization of
federal decision-making, bureaucratic inertia, military rule, non-transparent
and actual/perceived disproportionate sharing of wealth of natural resources,
and an archaic tribal system and its allied injustices have gravely contributed
to the political, social and economic alienation of Baloch peoples.
Regretfully, there is a consistent trend of (a.) employing heavy-handed
tactics, largely out of frustration and lack of clear strategy, against a
grievance, transforming it into an Insurgency resultantly, and (b.) not
addressing the underlying grievances of the people or reneging on the promises
made. This can not be helpful in building trust and goodwill, and is also not sustainable
in the age of social media when the flow of (dis/mis)information can not be
really controlled or suppressed. It is becoming obvious that while the
political elite is yet to put forward a dynamic constitutional dispensation for
tribal areas and Balochistan in over six decades, military solutions to
political problems would always be counterproductive especially when the
law-enforcing agencies, police or military, also do not have adequate training,
expertise or ability to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations.
According to de Tocqueville, the
health of a democratic society is measured by the quality of functions
performed by its private citizens. Regardless of the alleged role of external
or non-state actors in fanning the insurgency, a nation based on justice and
good can never accept injustice or oppression and should not allow for a
situation to develop in the first instance for someone to put fuel on the fire.
Two things are important here: (a.) an honest self-critique and recognition of
internal policy failures and management blunders to make amends for the future,
and (b.) to make public any tangible evidence of external support or incitement
for the insurgency, which is otherwise essential for an insurgency to realize
the goal of secession and become a nation-state, as was in the case of Mukti
Bahini.
Actions are but by intentions and
a government intending to good by an evil means becomes another evil. Mere
functionalist pandering to symptoms would be a band-aid and the underlying
disease needs to diagnosed and cured. Offering an amnesty or an apology but not
addressing the underlying root causes of grievances and estrangement can not
cure the malaise that is corroding the Pakistani body-politic. It is equally
important that the incumbent government do not use the current situation in
Balochistan or tribal areas as an excuse to delay the upcoming general elections or to
engineer their outcomes. Sincere efforts are rather needed to involve and integrate the
estranged groups into the political process. The following measures are
proposed for a meaningful debate to chart out the way forward:
1. A ‘National Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’ may be constituted including equal membership
from the federating/administrative units and minorities to conduct public
hearings through its subcommittees on human rights violations, rehabilitation,
and amnesty, within a timeframe set out by the parliament or by the Supreme
Court, so as to:
(i.) discover and reveal past
wrongdoings by state, non-state, internal or external actors;
(ii.) resolve the past grievances
and/or any ongoing or left-over conflict;
(iii.) build a civil-military
harmony to drive the country forward on the road to progress;
The South African experience can
well inform the creation, mandate, subcommittees and working of such a
Commission.
2. A ‘Constitutional &
Administrative Reforms Committee’ may be set up to improve on the work of
the ‘Reform Committee on Balochistan’ tasked by Liaquat Ali Khan in 1950 and
the recommendations made by the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan in 2005,
so as to accomplish the following within a stipulated timeframe and with
measurable benchmarks:
(i.) assure “ethnic parity” and
“provincial autonomy” to all federating units;
(ii.) devise processes to
strengthen devolution of power to municipal/city governments and reach a
political settlement to gradually phase out the colonial system of ‘indirect
rule,’ replacing it fully with direct and representative form of government
within a set timeframe;
(iii.) initiate measures to
delimit and eventually phase out the Levy System and the Frontier Crimes
Regulations within a set timeframe;
(iv.) abolish the sardari
tradition of collecting private revenues from tribesmen, industries or
corporations, and keeping of private prisons or militias;
(v.) revise the NFC award formula
to give weightage to level of development and backwardness, and evolve an
agreed formula for distribution and sharing of royalties or surcharges from
natural resources and port earnings between federating units;
(vi.) launch confidence-building
measures to mitigate the negative image and perception that outsiders were
intruding to gain control of and/or exploit Baloch/tribal natural resources;
(vii.) evolve an “inclusive and
participatory” approach to development planning and implementation (PSDP/ADP),
involving the relevant provincial governments and peoples;
(viii.) foster a system of open
“public consultations” on all draft policy instruments or initiatives at the
department/ministry-levels before finalization by the department head/minister;
(ix.) set up a mechanism wherein
all pre-submissions for federal cabinet regardless of the issue shall receive
strategic assessment and input from all federal ministries, and likewise all
PSDP/ADP pre-submissions shall receive strategic assessment and input from the
relevant provincial government;
(x.) balance geographic
distribution of socio-economic and infrastructure investments instead of
focussing on resource-rich areas or large metropolitan cities or urban centres
only;
(xi.) create opportunities for
local employment, health and education, boost local economic development and
raise the local standard of living;
‘A house divided against itself
can not stand!’ The perception of internal colonialism, economic exploitation,
ethnic disparity or oppression by the federation or a larger province must give
way to ethnic parity, provincial autonomy, equitable distribution of national
wealth, participatory development and collective decision-making!
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